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Abstract 
What is the place of emotion in intelligent robots? In the past two decades, researchers have advocated 
for the inclusion of some emotion-related components in the general information processing architecture 
of autonomous agents, say, for better communication with humans, or to instill a sense of urgency to 
action. The framework advanced here goes beyond these approaches and proposes that emotion and 
motivation need to be integrated with all aspects of the architecture. Thus, cognitive-emotional 
integration is a key design principle. Emotion is not an “add on” that endows a robot with “feelings” (for 
instance, reporting or expressing its internal state). It allows the significance of percepts, plans, and 
actions to be an integral part of all its computations. It is hypothesized that a sophisticated artificial 
intelligence cannot be built from separate cognitive and emotional modules. A hypothetical test inspired 
by the Turing test, called the Dolores test, is proposed to test this assertion.  
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Highlights 
 Most information-processing architectures of intelligent robots focus on cognition 
 Cognitive-emotional integration is as a key design principle of autonomous agents 
 Emotion is not an “add on” that endows a robot with “feelings”  
 Emotion allows significance of percepts/actions to be part of robots’ computations 
 Dolores test evaluates if autonomous agents can be built without emotion 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the first episode of Westworld, a popular HBO series, a human is examining Dolores, one of the central 
characters of the show. Dolores speaks with a heavy frontier accent. The human says “lose the accent,” to 
which she promptly acquiesces. Her answers are charged with emotion, they convey a deep feeling of 
confusion and anxiety; she’s distraught. The examiner then commands: “cognition only.” Once again, 
Dolores does as she’s told, losing all trace of emotion. Dolores is a “host” – how the humanoid robots are 
called – at Westworld, an Old West theme park created for the entertainment of human “guests” who are 
free to kill or have sex with them.  
For over two millennia, Western thinkers have separated emotion from cognition, emotion being the 
lowly sibling of the two. Cognition helps explain the quantum nature of matter and sends humans to the 
moon. Emotion might save the lioness in the savannah but makes humans act irrationally with 
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disconcerting frequency. Against this backdrop, how should autonomous robots be built? Should emotion 
be part of their information-processing architecture? If so, how should it interact with cognition? 
Cognition refers to processes such as memory, attention, language, problem solving, and planning. 
Many cognitive processes are thought to involve sophisticated functions that might be uniquely human. 
Furthermore, they often involve so-called controlled processes, such as when the pursuit of a goal needs 
to be protected from distraction. Whereas there is relative agreement about what constitutes cognition, 
there is less accord about emotion. Some investigators link it to the concepts of drive and motivation, 
suggesting that emotions are states elicited by rewards and punishers [1]. Others propose that emotions 
are involved in the evaluation of events, called “appraisals” [2], which can be explicit or implicit. Some 
approaches focus on basic emotions (for example, fear and anger [3]) while others focus on an extended 
set of emotions, including moral ones (for example, pride and envy [4]). Finally, many researchers suggest 
that emotions are strongly linked to bodily states [5]. 
In building an “intelligent” robot it might seem best to focus on its cognitive capacities, perhaps 
disregarding emotion entirely, or perhaps including only as much of emotion as necessary. Fig. 1A 
illustrates this scenario, where the blue segment represents a cognitive module and the orange segment 
indicates the emotion module of a hypothetical robot. When emotion is included, to avoid “emotional 
interference,” another design property would allow the cognitive module to downregulate emotion 
inputs, minimizing their influence to the desired extent. Thus, emotion is restricted to contributing to 
behavior only when deemed useful by the cognitive module. 
It is conceivable that the robot in Fig. 1A could function 
effectively in some settings. The cognitive architecture would 
endow it with the required problem-solving capabilities, and 
the emotion module would instantiate a sense of urgency 
into decisions and actions [6, 7]. The argument developed 
here, however, is that this type of architecture, in general, is 
inherently limited in its behavioral capabilities. For 
sophisticated intelligent behavior, I argue that cognition and 
emotion need to be intertwined in the general information-
processing architecture (Fig. 1B). 
What is meant by “sophisticated intelligent behavior?” 
While the goal here is not to precisely answer this question, 
the question can be rephrased as follows: “Does building 
models of emotional/affective mechanisms into our robots 
make them more natural, more useful, or more efficient?” 
[8]. Furthermore, a chief target goal should be autonomy, 
that is, the ability to function independently in diverse and 
challenging conditions and environments [9] (for example, 
interplanetary travel). Importantly, the argument made here 
for a cognitive-emotional architecture is not simply rooted in 
the need for better communication with humans ([10]; given 
that the latter do have emotion) or, relatedly, to generate 
emotional expressions [10], or even for survival-related 
purposes [7]. The contention is that, for the types of intelligent behaviors frequently described as 
cognitive (say, attention, problem solving, planning), the integration of emotion and cognition is 
necessary [11]. 
To motivate the information-processing architecture described here, I will first describe growing 
evidence that emotion and cognition are integrated in the brain. Next, general concepts of brain 
evolution will be reviewed, and implications for the organization of emotion and cognition in the brain 
 
Fig. 1. Information-processing architecture of 
intelligent robots. (A) Modular architecture 
with separate cognitive (blue) and emotional 
(red) components. The cognitive module also 
inhibits the emotion module when deemed 
necessary. (B) Non-modular architecture with 
integrated components. Reproduced with 
permission [104]. 
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discussed. Based on these ideas, a cognitive-emotional architecture will be motivated and proposed 
properties described. I will then develop the hypothesis that a humanoid robot cannot exhibit fully 
autonomous “interesting” behaviors without cognitive-emotional integration, which will be summarized 
via the “Dolores test.” General conclusions will be then outlined. 
 
 
2. COGNITION AND EMOTION IN THE BRAIN 
How is emotion organized in the brain? Historically, textbooks have described the emotional brain by 
listing a series of brain regions and discussing their purported main function(s) (see also [12]). Several 
subcortical regions would be featured, including the amygdala (“fear processing”), hypothalamus 
(“survival mechanisms”), periaqueductal gray (“defensive behaviors”), hippocampus (“emotional 
memory”), nucleus accumbens (“reward processing”), and so on. Cortical regions would include the 
cingulate cortex (“affective action”), insula (“processing of bodily signals”), and orbitofrontal cortex 
(“reward processing”). 
Although the idea that some brain regions are specialized for emotion is favored by some researchers 
[13], a different view has emerged in the past two decades, one in which emotion and cognition strongly 
interact and, in fact, are integrated in the brain [11, 14]. Before describing this perspective, I will first 
motivate it in intuitive terms.  
Consider a hypothetical organism that has its visual cortex (the part that receives signals from the 
eye’s retina) and its auditory cortex (the part that receives signals from the ear’s cochlea) heavily 
interconnected with each other. This architecture means that every time signals are processed by the 
visual cortex, they strongly influence auditory cortex, and vice versa – vision and audition mutually 
influence each other. Indeed, it would be better to call the parts of the brain in question visual-auditory 
(or audio-visual) areas. Even without studying behavior in our hypothetical organism, we could make the 
strong prediction that it would be unable to respond in a purely visual or auditory way. This is because its 
brain is built such that the two sensory domains have, in effect, no clear boundary – they are not 
independent modules.  
Emotion and cognition are not separable in the human brain for similar reasons. Knowledge about 
anatomy and physiology indicates that the two are closely intertwined [15]. Next, I describe principles of 
brain organization that reveal why emotion is not a distinct unit of the brain. 
 
2.1. Massive Combinatorial Anatomical Connectivity 
Computational analysis of anatomical connectivity demonstrates that both cortical and subcortical brain 
regions are densely interconnected [16-20] (Fig. 2). Rich connectivity is not limited to specific sectors of 
the brain (say, prefrontal cortex) but instead encompasses all of them (including brainstem and 
cerebellum). Central anatomical properties include: 1) Massive interconnectivity; 2) High global 
accessibility [21]; and 3) The existence of a “connectivity core” or “rich-club” of regions marked by 
especially high levels of connectivity [21, 22]. Focusing on macaque cortical regions, one study described 
a core set of 17 regions spanning parietal, temporal, and frontal cortex that was marked by 92% 
connectivity density (92% of the connections that could exist were present) [23]. By combining multiple 
sources of data, another study described a core that was distributed across all major brain sectors (all 
cortical lobes, thalamus, and subcortical regions in the forebrain) [22]. 
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In all, the anatomical 
connectivity is such that signals can 
flow between disparate regions in 
very few steps. And because hub 
regions (those that are particularly 
well connected) aggregate and 
distribute information widely, 
diverse types of signals (say, related 
to perception and action) have the 
opportunity to influence one 
another [24]. 
 
2.2. High Distributed Functional 
Connectivity  
Understanding brain function 
requires characterizing how regions 
are “functionally connected.” The 
idea of functional connectivity was 
devised to characterize how 
neurons (or regions) interact and was defined as the “temporal coherence” among their activity, for 
example, as measured by correlating their signals [25-27]. Hence, functional connectivity is essentially a 
description of the joint state of two brain elements, regardless of their anatomical connectivity status 
(linked by a strong or weak anatomical connection, or even not directly linked at all). 
Thus, in general, what is important is not simply a region’s anatomical location, but its position in a 
space of functional relationships to other regions [27-29]. From the perspective of a brain region, at a 
given time, a region affiliates with a set of other regions, thereby defining a momentary functional circuit. 
And relatively spared coordinated activity can emerge in brains with substantially altered structural 
connectivity [30, 31]. In all, anatomical architectural features support the efficient communication of 
information even when strong direct structural connections are absent [32-34], and allow functional 
interactions that vary as a function of context. 
It should be pointed out that “functional connectivity” does not distinguish certain scenarios. 
Consider, for example, two neuronal populations, A and B1. Even if A and B are temporally coherent in 
their activation but only one triggers a causally related consequence in C, the functional connectivity 
between A and B does not include that information (and some could even question the validity of stating 
that they are functionally connected). Whereas this is potentially a problem, establishing causation in 
complex systems is far from straightforward. In fact, the type of Newtonian “billiard ball” causation model 
at times applied to reasoning about the brain (in this case, A “causes” B much like a billiard ball hitting 
another) may be in need of a revision [35-37]. For example, “probabilistic causation” [38] or “dynamical 
systems causation” offer promising avenues. In the latter, the goal is to investigate causation in (possibly 
non-linear) dynamical systems, and two variables are “causally linked” if they participate in the same 
dynamical system [39]. 
 
 
2.3. Overlapping and Dynamic Brain Networks  
Networks of brain regions collectively support behaviors. Thus, the network itself is the unit, not the brain 
region. Indeed, research characterizing both anatomical (e.g., [22]) and functional (e.g., [40]) networks 
                                                          
1 I thank a reviewer for bringing up this point. 
Fig. 2. Large-scale anatomical connectivity. (A) Network analysis of 
anatomical datasets reveals massive interconnectivity among all sectors of 
the brain. (B) Illustration of the major lobes of cortex (top) and some of the 
regions mentioned in the text (bottom). Part (A) reproduced with permission 
[22]. 
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has grown rapidly in the last decade, and a host of specific networks have been proposed, such as the 
“salience” (important during the processing of salient events) and “executive” (important during cognitive 
processes, including attention and working memory) networks [41]. 
At the same time, analysis of anatomical/functional data has repeatedly revealed regions with 
widespread connectivity (see section above). This implies that describing brain network in terms of 
disjoint sets of regions (where each brain region belongs to a single network or cluster) only partly 
captures the complexity of the organization. It is important, therefore, to elucidate the overlapping 
structure of networks [42]. In several scientific disciplines, there is increasing realization that actual 
networks are best understood in terms of overlapping subsystems [43]. In neuroscience, disjoint 
networks (that is, non-overlapping) have been favored, although recent investigations have started to 
study potential ways to characterize overlapping organization [44, 45]. 
In a recent study, we investigated the potential overlapping structure of functional brain connectivity 
in a data-driven fashion [46]. Instead of assuming that regions belong to a single network, we allowed 
them to belong to all communities (Fig. 3). Thus, when community organization was determined, a node's 
participation to every community was estimated; participation strengths were called membership values. 
Each node was assigned a probability-like membership value to each of the existing communities, 
resulting in a membership vector with entries between 0 and 1 (and summing to 1); entries close to 1 
indicated membership to essentially one community, that is, the non-overlapping case. The approach to 
detecting overlapping communities we adopted was originally based on the mixed-membership 
stochastic blocks model [47] within the context of stochastic variational inference [48]. The specific 
algorithm we employed was developed by Gopalan and Blei [49], and can be viewed as a generative 
Bayesian algorithm favoring assortativity (nodes with similar memberships are more likely to cluster 
together). 
When applied to resting-state fMRI data, the 
algorithm captured community organization 
matching many of the general features of standard 
disjoint networks. However, the analysis indicated 
that overlapping communities are not fully 
captured by a single disjoint community, and that 
they contain information that is not well described 
by disjoint communities. To gain a richer 
understanding of the overlapping networks 
obtained, for each community, we considered the 
entire distribution of membership values, that is, 
we considered the membership values of all brain 
regions simultaneously. A community containing 
nodes that affiliated mostly with that community 
would exhibit a membership distribution with 
values close to 1. Instead, we found that all mixed 
communities had many regions with non-trivial 
membership values far from the peak of 1, which 
indicated that the overlapping communities were 
not well described by “exclusive nodes” (nodes that 
participated in only one community) but by “multi-partner nodes” (nodes that participated in multiple 
communities). 
Furthermore, brain networks are not static but evolve temporally [50, 51]. Although anatomical 
pathways change across the life span, faster dynamics are an essential ingredient of functional 
connections between regions, which vary as a function of context, and are altered by cognitive, 
 
Fig. 3. Overlapping networks. In standard clustering 
approaches, communities are comprised on disjoint sets 
of nodes. In the framework of overlapping networks (or 
mixed membership), each brain region affiliates with 
multiple communities with varying strengths called 
“membership values.” For each brain region, these are 
probability-like values between 0 and 1 that sum to 1 
(summed across communities). Here, the membership 
values of region Ri are based on strengths to each of 
communities C1 to C4. Reproduced with permission [55]. 
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emotional, and motivational variables, among others. Therefore, network organization is a dynamic 
property. Indeed, the growth of methods to characterize time-varying functional connectivity has begun 
to yield novel characterizations of how network organization evolves [52-54]. In sum, networks are not 
static and fixed collections of brain regions; they are dynamic coalitions of regions that form and dissolve 
to meet specific computational needs. This poses several challenges, as the very notion of a network as a 
coherent unit is undermined. For instance, at what point does a coalition of regions become something 
other than, say, the salience network? An approach to modeling networks in general that partly mitigates 
this problem is to conceptualize networks as inherently overlapping. Instead of treating nodes as 
belonging to a single network, in overlapping networks, each node is a member of every network with a 
specific probability like membership value, which can then fluctuate across time [55]. 
Dynamic aspects of network function naturally will benefit from understanding interactions in terms 
of non-linear dynamical systems. Such systems undergo qualitative changes in behavior (so-called 
bifurcations) as a function of their input and/or parameter changes. For example, Hansen and colleagues 
[56], show via simulations of a whole-brain mean-field computational model that functional connectivity 
exhibits rapid transitions between a few discrete states. In the so-called “resting-state” (when 
participants are not explicitly engaged in a task), such state transitions are spontaneous and often very 
sharp. 
 
2.4. Anatomical Connectivity to and from the Body 
Emotion is closely linked to bodily states, and the very history of emotion research is defined by the 
discussion and controversy surrounding the question of the necessity of the body for emotion [5]. The 
exact role of the body in emotion notwithstanding, brain circuits that involve signals to and from the body 
are important for associated processes.  
Brain connectivity affecting the body originates in both cortex and subcortex. In cortex, a notable 
region is the cingulate cortex [57,58], whose descending projections to autonomic regulatory structures 
have been amply described (autonomic functions include respiration, heart rate, and pupil response) [59]. 
This connectivity is consistent with effects of cingulate electrical stimulation on virtually all autonomic 
processes, as well as many endocrine mechanisms. Conversely, visceral pathways carrying signals from 
the body to the brain reach multiple subcortical and cortical regions. In particular, cortical regions with 
notable body-related signals include the orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate gyrus, and the insula [60]. For 
example, the physiological condition of the entire body is conveyed to the posterior insular cortex [60], 
which can be considered interceptive cortex, much like parts of parietal cortex are somatosensory cortex, 
for example. In conclusion, both cortex and subcortex are part of extensive connectional systems that link 
the body to the brain. In this manner, the entire spectrum of brain signals can affect the body, and vice 
versa. 
 
2.5. Merging Cognition and Emotion in the Brain 
In summary, anatomical and functional studies reveal that brain regions are massively interconnected. In 
particular, the brain basis of emotion involves large-scale cortical-subcortical networks that are 
distributed and sensitive to bodily signals [15]. The high degree of signal distribution and integration 
provides a nexus for the intermixing of information related to perception, cognition, emotion, motivation, 
and action. Importantly, the functional architecture consists of multiple overlapping networks that are 
highly dynamic and context sensitive. Thus, how a given brain region affiliates with a specific network 
shifts as a function of task demands and brain state.  
Whereas some regions are more highly interconnected than others, overall information can travel 
from one part of the brain to another in just a few steps. This implies that the brain’s architecture does 
not leave much room for isolation of signals; it is promiscuous, with information of a given type being 
mixed with others. Furthermore, adopting a large-scale network perspective to brain organization helps 
7 
 
clarify why some brain structures, such as the amygdala, are thought to be important for emotion: they 
are important hubs of large-scale connectivity systems. It also illuminates why the impact of emotion is so 
wide ranging – for one, it is not possible to impact emotion without affecting cognition. 
 
 
3. BRAIN EVOLUTION, COGNITION, AND EMOTION 
From an evolutionary perspective, it is sometimes stated that cognition can be considered “the tip of the 
iceberg,” often associated with “newer” parts of the cortex, while the rest of the iceberg involves 
emotional processes that rely on “old” subcortical brain regions. Furthermore, it is presumed that the old 
emotional system functions in a largely autonomous manner (for discussion, see [61]). 
Some brain system can indeed be considered old. For example, anatomical and behavioral data 
suggest that ray-finned fishes and land vertebrates probably share an ancestor (>420 million years ago) 
that already possessed some form of an amygdala [62] – a subcortical region that is believed to be 
particularly important for emotional processing [63]. And the amygdala of the ancestral amniote (which 
includes reptiles, birds, and mammals; around 340 million years ago) is believed to have had parts that 
are key subregions of the human amygdala, for example [62]. 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, neuroanatomists proposed the idea that brain evolution 
takes place in a fairly progressive fashion, from fishes to amphibians, to reptiles, to birds, and then 
mammals (culminating with the human brain) – the idea of progression goes back to Aristotle. In this 
scheme, the brain evolved via the sequential addition of parts. Thus, in the brain of a cat (a mammal) one 
could discern older parts that remained largely unchanged underneath the cortex [64]. Furthermore, it 
was proposed that structures at the top control the ones at the bottom [61]. Unfortunately, this 
erroneous viewpoint [65] became dominant in neuroscience for many decades. It reached its most 
dramatic example in Paul MacLean’s proposal of the “triune brain,” which consisted of a reptilian 
complex (at the base of the brain, including brainstem), to which an “old brain” was added, and later a 
“new cortex” included in mammals [66]. In the context of the present review, it is noteworthy that the 
organization shown in Fig. 1A very much resembles this notion. 
It is now known that such framework does not reflect current knowledge of comparative 
neuroanatomy and does not adequately describe brain evolution (not even in general terms) [65,67]. But 
what is the basic plan of the vertebrate brain? The chassis of the brain of fishes, amphibians, and all other 
vertebrates contains both subcortex (with multiple parts) and simple forms of cortex (called pallium). 
With evolution, brain changes occurred across the brain. But importantly, new circuits originated in a 
manner that affected both cortex and subcortex. 
An example of this type of mutual embedding is provided by the amygdala. In mammals, this 
structure is composed of a dozen or more subregions. In one study it was found that some amygdala 
subregions are considerably more “developed” in monkeys than in rats (based on morphological 
characteristics, such as cell counts and the volume of subregions) [68]. One possibility is that the 
observed differences between rats and monkeys are linked to the degree of connectivity of amygdala 
subregions to other brain structures (for related discussion, see [67]). In other words, the changes in the 
amygdala may have paralleled the development of the cortical areas with which these nuclei are 
interconnected in primates. 
Taken together, brain evolution likely proceeded via the mutual embedding of new and old 
structures, not by the modular addition of parts. Furthermore, separation of “old” and “new” parts does 
not take into account the extensive anatomical connectivity of brain circuits, as previously discussed, nor 
the overlapping and dynamic nature of brain networks.  
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4. COGNITIVE-EMOTIONAL ARCHITECTURES 
With the discussion of the previous two sections in mind, we can return to the central question addressed 
here: What kind of architecture should an intelligent, autonomous robot have? Although a broad range of 
cognitive architectures have been proposed [69-73]; for review, see [74]), a general principle is that they 
are modular (Fig. 4A). For example, they may have low-level modules for action and perception, mid-level 
modules for task coordination and mid-level perception, and higher levels for task planning and visual 
cognition, say. Frequently, the top level is connected to a knowledge database. To coordinate the 
modules, a central controller or supervisor is also posited, which utilizes temporary buffers as part of an 
active workspace. By and large, the architecture is hierarchical, although parallel components and 
organization are recognized as important, too [75].  
In the past two decades, a steady stream of researchers have advocated for the inclusion of emotion-
related components to the general information processing architecture (or “cognitive” architecture, as 
sometimes it is still referred) [10, 70, 76-82]; see contributions in [83]). One type of argument is that 
emotion components are needed to instill urgency to action and decisions [7]. Others have advocated 
emotion components to aid understand emotion in humans, or to generate human-like expressions (for 
empathy, say) [10]. In broad terms, a first-pass effort at including affect entails adding an emotion 
module so that it can influence other components of the architecture (Fig. 4B). Another aspect 
emphasized in the literature is that emotion can be used to generate an internal state that influences 
actions [e.g., 82, 84] (Fig. 3B, right). 
The framework advanced here goes beyond these approaches and proposes that emotion and 
motivation need to be integrated with all aspects of the architecture. In particular, emotion-related 
mechanisms influence processing beyond the modulatory aspects of “moods” linked to internal states 
(hunger, sex-drive, etc.). Of note, in the literature, emotion is often linked to evaluative aspects of the 
organism-environment relationship and with affective states; motivation is associated with how the 
organism acts in a given situation (approach vs. withdrawal). Given the integrationist framework 
described here, I do not make this distinction [11]. 
As described previously, emotion is not neatly encapsulated in a specific part of the brain – one 
cannot point to emotion in the brain. In addition, cognition was not a late addition to the mammalian, or 
 
Fig. 4. Cognition and emotion in information-processing architectures. (A) Central components of existing cognitive 
architectures, with a modular and largely hierarchical organization. (B) Emotion can be considered as an additional 
module of the architecture that interfaces with some of the cognitive components. In particular, it can be used to 
determine “mood” and “feeling”. The region with dashed outline corresponds to the architecture in part A. 
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human, brain [65]. So, how can we operationalize it in an information-processing architecture? Emotion 
can be thought of as a set of valuating mechanisms that help organize behavior [85], for instance by 
helping take into account both the costs and benefits linked to percepts and actions [86]. At a general 
level, it can be viewed as a biasing mechanism, much like the “cognitive” function of attention. However, 
such conceptualization is overly simplistic because emotion does not amount to just providing an extra 
boost to a specific sensory input, potential plan, or action. When the brain is conceptualized as a complex 
system of highly interacting networks of regions, we see that emotion is interlocked with perception, 
cognition, motivation, and action. Whereas we can refer to certain behaviors as “emotional” or 
“cognitive,” this is only a language short-cut. Thus, the idea of a biasing mechanism is too limited. From a 
design perspective, all components of the architecture should be influenced by emotional and 
motivational variables (and vice versa). Thus, the architecture must be strongly non-modular. 
To illustrate these ideas, I will describe architectural features inspired by knowledge of brain and 
behavior. The focus will be on visual perception and executive control, but related schemes can be used 
in the case of action, too, as adaptive behavior requires monitoring and evaluating the outcome of 
actions. I will build upon a conceptual framework called the dual competition model which describes how 
both emotional and motivational signals are integrated with perception and cognition so as to effectively 
incorporate value into the unfolding of behavior [87]. The general framework is displayed in Fig. 5A. 
Because the use of boxes invites a modular interpretation, the architecture is better represented in terms 
of overlapping networks of processes or mechanisms (Fig. 5B). 
 
4.1. Perceptual competition 
Objects in the environment compete for limited perceptual processing capacity and control of behavior 
[88-90]. Because processing capacity for vision is limited [91], selective attention to one part of the visual 
field comes at the cost of neglecting other parts. Thus, a popular notion is that there is competition for 
resources in visual cortex [88,92]. 
In operationalizing 
competition, we can use the 
concept of a priority map, which 
contains representations of spatial 
locations that are behaviorally 
important [93,94]. Traditionally, 
“bottom-up” factors (such as 
stimulus salience) and “top-down” 
factors (such as goal relevance) 
were emphasized as the major 
inputs to determine priority. To 
these, we must add affective 
significance (for instance, based 
on the prior co-occurrence of a 
stimulus with aversive events) and 
motivational significance (for instance, based on the prior co-occurrence of a stimulus with rewards) (Fig. 
6A) (see also [95]). In terms of implementation, the architecture requires mechanisms to embed affective 
and motivational significance, as well as stimulus- and goal-related factors, into perception. This can be 
accomplished via an explicit priority map (Fig. 6A) or by having multiple influences converge on 
representations of sensory stimuli (Fig. 6B). In the brain, perceptual competition occurs in part via 
interactions between regions important for attention (in frontal and parietal cortices, for example) and 
those that are particularly tuned to the evaluation of affective and motivational significance. 
 
Fig. 5. Dual competition model. (A) Dual competition framework where 
emotion and motivation are integrated with perception and cognition. (B) 
Schematic representation of some of the network interactions linked to the 
model. In particular, the valuation network is important in the determination 
of affective and motivational significance. Reproduced with permission [105]. 
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But the above should not be viewed as just an extension of the priority map with just additional 
variables. In particular, if one considers a predictive coding framework [96, 97], internal models of the 
current input will incorporate features along multiple dimensions, including sensory ones but also 
affective and motivational significance. Thus, establishing a predictive code involves building internal 
models that incorporate all of 
these dimensions 
simultaneously. 
 
4.2. Executive control 
At the heart of cognition, 
executive control refers to 
operations involved in 
maintaining and updating 
information, monitoring 
conflict and/or errors, resisting 
distracting information, 
inhibiting prepotent responses, 
and shifting mental sets. A 
useful way to conceptualize 
executive control is in terms of 
a set of processes, including 
inhibition, updating, and 
shifting [98]. These processes 
are not independent, however; 
when a given function is 
necessitated, resources 
devoted to one component will 
not be available to other 
operations and interference 
will ensue, possibly 
compromising performance [11]. 
Dealing with an emotional stimulus or situation requires the types of behavioral adjustments that 
characterize executive function. For example, updating might be needed to refresh the contents of 
working memory, shifting might be recruited to switch the current task set, and inhibition might be 
invoked to cancel previously planned actions. In this manner, specific resources are coordinated in the 
service of emotional processing (Fig. 6C) and, if temporarily unavailable to additional task requirements, 
would compromise performance – the stronger the emotional manipulation, the stronger the 
interference (see below). A laboratory example might help illustrate these ideas. Suppose a participant is 
performing an effortful task of some sort and a change of background color signals that she will receive a 
mild shock sometime in the next 30 seconds. The participant may update the contents of working 
memory to include the “shock possible” information. Shifting may occur in that the participant may shift 
between the execution of the cognitive task and “monitoring for shock” (and possibly preparing for the 
aversive event) every few seconds. Now, if another cue stimulus indicated that shock would be delivered 
in the next second, the participant might temporarily inhibit response to the task to prepare for the 
shock. Altogether, dealing with the emotional situation necessitates the same types of executive 
functions considered to be the hallmark of cognition. 
Importantly, the intensity of the emotional stimulus (or context) determines if it will improve or 
hinder behavioral performance. Moderate intensity, in particular, allows resources to be devoted to the 
 
Fig. 6. Cognitive-emotional integration. (A) A priority map contains spatial 
locations of behavioral importance which are determined by combining multiple 
factors, including emotional/motivational ones. (B) Perceptual competition is 
influenced by multiple factors which determine the stimulus representation that 
should to be prioritized (“wins the competition”). (C) Executive control can be 
conceptualized as a series of processes that are partly interdependent (here, 
inhibition, updating, and shifting). Affective and motivational inputs engage the 
same processes at the core of cognition. (D). Behavioral performance is a function 
of the intensity of the emotional stimulus or context. 
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situation at hand, improving performance. However, if the intensity is high enough, processes may be 
temporarily unavailable to handle the aspects of the situation adequately. This inverted-U type of 
relationship is common in many behavioral settings (Fig. 6D).  
 
 
5. THE DOLORES TEST FOR ROBOTICS 
Let us consider the humanoid robots of Westworld again. In the scene previously referred to, the central 
humanoid character, Dolores, was asked to consider and describe her situation by using cognition only. 
But could a human “lose all emotion” and describe complex events without a trace of affect like Dolores 
did? The present framework indicates that the answer to this question is “no.” Unlike Dolores, humans 
cannot lose all emotion and simply proceed cognitively. The brain is organized such that the mind doesn’t 
behave in this manner. 
Dolores is not human; she is a robot built for the amusement of humans. Could a sophisticated 
artificial intelligence be built with separate cognitive and emotional modules? I contend that such a 
humanoid would be a far cry from the complex hosts of the series, whose behaviors are only possible 
when emotion and cognition are intertwined. Dolores, for one, would be unable to reflect about her past 
in a meaningful way just cognitively; emotion is part and parcel of her understanding of the world. And 
this is not just because she lives in a violent, ruthless world, but because making sense of reality 
necessitates the integration of emotion and cognition. Could this prediction be tested? 
In 1950, Alan Turing [99] proposed a test to establish the presence of thought in a computer by 
assessing a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behavior indistinguishable from that of a human. In the 
Turing test, an interrogator is supposed to be in a room separated from a machine and another person. 
The object of the game is for the interrogator to determine which of the other two is the person and 
which is the machine. The game is such that the human interrogator is physically separated from the 
other two. I propose, instead, the Dolores test: one cannot build a humanoid that behaves in a manner as 
sophisticated as Dolores does that is built with separate emotional and cognitive modules.  
A scenario somewhat similar to that 
envisioned by the Dolores test is featured 
in the 1982 movie Blade Runner. Humans 
paid to track down rogue humanoids use 
the “Voight-Kampff device,” a polygraph-
like machine used to help determine 
whether or not an individual is a robot. The 
machine measures bodily signals linked to 
respiration, blush response, heart rate, and 
eye movement in response to questions 
dealing with emotion and empathy. 
However, the Dolores test proposed here is 
fundamentally distinct from the one in 
Blade Runner. It is not based on the idea 
that bodily responses to emotionally 
charged situations would deviate in a 
detectable way in robots. Instead, it is 
based on the hypothetical scenario that a 
robot could be built and that it would 
display “sophisticated behaviors” of the 
kind produced by the robots in Westworld. 
The idea of the test is that, by observing 
 
Fig. 7. The Dolores test. The test states that, by observing 
behaviors as humanoids interact with both other humanoids and 
humans, humans and humanoids would be confused with each 
other unless the latter were built with a non-modular cognitive-
emotional architecture. In this depiction of a scene from 
Westworld, Dolores interacts with two humans (one tied to the 
chair, another immediately to her right), and is watched by two 
other humanoid robots. Reproduced with permission [104]. 
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behaviors as the humanoids interact with both other humanoids and humans, humans and humanoids 
would not be confused with each other if the latter were built according to a modular cognitive-
emotional architecture (Fig. 7) – that is, complex behaviors require a non-modular architecture. 
Of course, to make the test sufficiently precise, it would be necessary to operationalize “sophisticated 
behaviors.” In particular, Turing believed that the question of whether or not machines can think was 
“too meaningless” to deserve discussion, and therefore sought to formulate the “Imitation Game,” with 
the interrogator separated from the machine and the other person, as described above. 
It has been argued that passing the Turing test does not necessarily show “intelligence.” For example, 
the Chinese Room argument by Seale [100] points out that complex rule-based transformations may yield 
apparent understanding when only mechanical rules are being applied [101]. Could the behavior required 
to pass the Dolores test be generated by a set of complex rules? Although a more extended discussion 
should be taken up elsewhere in the future, the Chinese Room argument itself has fostered intense 
debate [101]. For instance, both the “systems reply” and the “virtual machine reply” argue that 
understanding is not present at the level of rule implementation per se (assuming it would be possible), 
but at the “systems level” including the rule-implementation mechanisms and (possibly all) other 
components at play – thus creating a “virtual” agent that does understand.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
How should intelligent, autonomous robots be built? Information-processing architectures have mostly 
focused on cognitive components. In the past two decades, emotion components have been increasingly 
described and advocated as a way to improve human-robot communication, including the understanding 
of human facial expressions and the generation of expressions to communicate internal states. The 
survival argument has also been emphasized; emotion can then be used to help prioritize processes and 
actions that foster continued existence. 
The central argument of the present framework is not that emotion is needed – the answer is a 
definitive “yes” – but that emotion and motivation need to be integrated with all information-processing 
components. This implies that cognitive-emotional integration is a principle of the architecture. Emotion 
is not an “add on” that endows a robot with “feelings” (for instance, reporting or expressing its internal 
state). It allows the significance of percepts, plans, and actions to be an integral part of all its 
computations. 
Another implication of the present framework is that the traditional modular engineering approach is 
inadequate for autonomous robots. What we know about behavior and the brain of mammals (indeed of 
vertebrates more generally) suggests that an approach heavily influenced by biology is needed. In such 
framework, centralized control is abdicated, and distributed control is adopted. Cognitive and brain 
science have struggled with the concept of a homunculus, where “too much” intelligence is relegated to 
one of its components (but how does that component itself acquire its sophistication?) [102, 103]. 
Information-processing architectures for artificial agents need, likewise, to banish such notions of 
centralized control (a homunculus). 
To return to the scenarios inspired by the Westworld series. Humans cannot “lose all emotion” and 
continue with their daily lives. I content that sophisticated, autonomous robots will prove the same. They 
will need cognition and emotion as integrated “components” of their information-processing 
architecture. 
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Figure captions 
 
Fig. 1. Information-processing architecture of intelligent robots. (A) Modular architecture with separate 
cognitive (blue) and emotional (red) components. The cognitive module also inhibits the emotion module 
when deemed necessary. (B) Non-modular architecture with integrated components. Reproduced with 
permission [104]. 
 
Fig. 2. Large-scale anatomical connectivity. (A) Network analysis of anatomical datasets reveals massive 
interconnectivity among all sectors of the brain. (B) Illustration of the major lobes of cortex (top) and 
some of the regions mentioned in the text (bottom). Part (A) reproduced with permission [22]. 
 
Fig. 3. Overlapping networks. In standard clustering approaches, communities are comprised on disjoint 
sets of nodes. In the framework of overlapping networks (or mixed membership), each brain region 
affiliates with multiple communities with varying strengths called “membership values.” For each brain 
region, these are probability-like values between 0 and 1 that sum to 1 (summed across communities). 
Here, the membership values of region Ri are based on strengths to each of communities C1 to C4. 
Reproduced with permission [55]. 
 
Fig. 4. Cognition and emotion in information-processing architectures. (A) Central components of existing 
cognitive architectures, with a modular and largely hierarchical organization. (B) Emotion can be 
considered as an additional module of the architecture that interfaces with some of the cognitive 
components. In particular, it can be used to determine “mood” and “feeling”. The region with dashed 
outline corresponds to the architecture in part A.  
 
Fig. 5. Dual competition model. (A) Dual competition framework where emotion and motivation are 
integrated with perception and cognition. (B) Schematic representation of some of the network 
interactions linked to the model. In particular, the valuation network is important in the determination of 
affective and motivational significance. Reproduced with permission [105]. 
 
Fig. 6. Cognitive-emotional integration. (A) A priority map contains spatial locations of behavioral 
importance which are determined by combining multiple factors, including emotional/motivational ones. 
(B) Perceptual competition is influenced by multiple factors which determine the stimulus representation 
that should to be prioritized (“wins the competition”). (C) Executive control can be conceptualized as a 
series of processes that are partly interdependent (here, inhibition, updating, and shifting). Affective and 
motivational inputs engage the same processes at the core of cognition. (D). Behavioral performance is a 
function of the intensity of the emotional stimulus or context. 
 
Fig. 7. The Dolores test. The test states that, by observing behaviors as humanoids interact with both 
other humanoids and humans, humans and humanoids would be confused with each other unless the 
latter were built with a non-modular cognitive-emotional architecture. In this depiction of a scene from 
Westworld, Dolores interacts with two humans (one tied to the chair, another immediately to her right), 
and is watched by two other humanoid robots. Reproduced with permission [104]. 
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